Ripeness and the Constitution
Gene R. Nichol, Jr.t
In a decade and a half of decision making, the record of the
Burger Court proved, in many ways, a surprising one. Neither the
conservative monolith suggested by its early "Nixon Court" label,
nor the enthusiastic heir of its predecessor's egalitarian agenda, the
Court constructed a mixed legacy of activism and restraint.1 Although the Court's overriding approach to constitutional problems
has proven difficult to characterize, recurrent themes are clearly
ascertainable.' This article will touch on one particular, perhaps
distinctive, legacy of the Burger4 Court: the constitutionalization of
the law of federal justiciability.
For decades prior to the 1970s, principles of justiciability-standing, mootness, ripeness, political questions, and
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Redish, Erwin Chemerinsky, and William Marshall. This paper was delivered at a faculty
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See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., An Activism of Ambivalence, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 315 (1984)
(reviewing Victor Blasi, The Burger Court: The Counterrevolution That Wasn't (1983));
Norman Dorsen, The United States Supreme Court: Trends and Prospects, 21 Harv. Civ.
Rts.-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 1 (1986).
2 See Blasi, The Burger Court at 198-217 (cited in note 1).
I See generally Nichol, 98 Harv. L. Rev. at 319-22 (cited in note 1); Blasi, The Burger
Court (cited in note 1).
' Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution states in part: "The judicial Power
shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of
the United States, and Treaties made under their Authority; ... to Controversies between
two or more states." These phrases have been interpreted to encompass the "case or controversy" requirement of article III. To limit repetition, I have used the terms "case or controversy" and "article III" interchangeably. There is, of course, more to article III than the case
or controversy requirement. The provision sets forth the "arising under" jurisdiction, the
constitutional diversity jurisdiction, and so on. In this essay, however, I consider only the
case or controversy component of article III.
Throughout this article, I use the term "jurisdiction" in a limited sense. This essay
addresses the constitutional and quasi-constitutional limitations on the power of the federal
courts found in article III. Accordingly, "jurisdiction" here refers to limits on federal power
that relate to the case or controversy requirement, rather than other jurisdictional barriers
such as subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction.
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the like--inhabited a hazy middle ground between prudential concern and constitutional mandate. If traditional limits on the exercise of judicial power operated restrictively, their claimed ties to
the Constitution were at best indistinct and not fully articulated.
The Warren Court, in response to the fused justiciability doctrines
it encountered, launched an energetic, if ultimately imperfect, attempt both to segregate and to liberalize the various strands of ju7
risdictional analysis.
The resulting expansion of judicial purview caused the Burger
Court immediate concern.8 The reaction of the justices over the
course of the past decade has been, if not consistent,' at least directed. The Court has fortified the barriers of standing, mootness,
and ripeness faced by federal litigants. 10 Indeed, the Burger Court
has suggested quite pointedly that these justiciability doctrines are
rooted in, and demanded by, the Constitution itself-specifically,
the "case or controversy" requirement of article III." By limiting
intervention to the protection of concrete, particularized, continu8 For examples of other principles the Supreme Court has used in denying federal jurisdiction, see United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 (1943) (feigned or collusive
cases); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 446 (1965) (adequate and independent state
ground); Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 47 (1971) (no real issue
between parties).
a Consider, for example, the constitutional status of Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S.
447, 486-89 (1923) (dismissing taxpayer challenge to allegedly illegal appropriation on
ground that allowing such suits would encroach upon the legislative power).
See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 91-106 (1968) (Frothinghamdoes not bar taxpayer suits involving establishment clause challenges to public expenditures); Association of
Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 156-58 (1970) (enlarging class of persons
with standing to challenge administrative rulings).
8 See the Chief Justice's opinion in Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972), reversing the
court of appeals's finding of jurisdiction on the ground that the litigant's theory of standing
would make the federal courts "virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness
of Executive action."
9 Two notable exceptions-granting liberal access-are Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 68-82 (1978); and Watt v. Energy Action Educational
Foundation 454 U.S. 151, 160-62 (1981).
'0 See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-502 (1975) (standing requires, among
other things, distinct and palpable injury); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 17180 (1974) (denying taxpayer standing to challenge failure to publish CIA budget); DeFunis v
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316-20 (1974) (law student's challenge to affirmative action program
ruled moot); Williamson County Regional Planning Comm. v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172,
105 S.Ct. 3108 (1985) (restrictive ripeness ruling).
11 The Burger Court clearly viewed standing as a doctrine of constitutional stature. See
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39, 44-46 (1976) ("EKWRO");
Warth, 422 U.S. at 502-08. The same is true of the mootness doctrine, see DeFunis, 416 U.S.
at 316-20, and the ripeness doctrine, see, e.g., Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 297
(1979). See also notes 64-67 and accompanying text below.
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ing injuries, 12 article III assertedly restrains federal courts from
moving beyond the scope of the "judicial Power." 13 Article III requirements have been designed, as a group, to ensure the
"proper-and properly limited-role" 4 of the unelected federal judiciary in our democratic system of government.
This essay will focus on one aspect of the Burger Court's article III legacy: the ripeness doctrine. The subject of little academic
comment, at least compared to other components of justiciability,"5
the ripeness analysis employed by modern federal courts has met
with consistent approval. 8 However, the Burger Court's decision
to constitutionalize ripeness poses special problems for the clarity
and workability of the doctrine. It also bodes poorly for the comprehensibility of the case or controversy requirement of article III.
Aspects of the ripeness doctrine are anomalous for a requirement rooted in the Constitution. The demands of the principle
vary greatly according to the dictates and posture of the claim on
the merits. In operation, therefore, the ripeness requirement often
is indistinguishable from actionability analysis. Other cases use
this requirement to ensure that judicial decision making is carried
on with the requisite factual foundation, or under a time frame
that avoids premature interference with the regulatory actions of
other government bodies. In short, except for those instances in
which ripeness analysis is employed to eschew advisory opinions-a task performed more directly by the standing requirement-the doctrine serves goals that the Court has typically characterized as prudential rather than constitutional. It aims to finetune the decision-making process of the federal courts and to measure the demands of substantive constitutional principle. These
tasks are essential. They are not best performed, however, by an
12 EKWRO, 426 U.S. at 39, 44-46; Warth, 422 U.S. at 502-08; DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 31620.
13

Article III provides, in part, that the "judicial Power" extends to the determination

of various "Cases" and "Controversies."
1 Warth, 422 U.S. at 498.
15 The literature on standing is voluminous. See, for example, the authorities listed in

Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 68, 68 n.3 (1984). The mootness
doctrine has received attention as well. See, e.g., Don B. Kates, Jr. and William T. Barker,
Mootness in Judicial Proceedings: Toward a Coherent Theory, 62 Cal. L. Rev. 1385 (1974);
Comment, A Search for Principles of Mootness in the Federal Courts, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 1289
(1976).
10 See, e.g., Kenneth Culp Davis, 4 Administrative Law Treatise § 25:2 at 351 (2d ed.
1983). Consider also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Sidney A. Shapiro, and Paul R. Verkuil, Administrative Law and Process 199-202 (1985); Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Edward H. Cooper, 13A Federal Practice and Procedure § 3532 at 112 (2d ed. 1984) ("Federal
Practice").
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overarching barrier to the exercise of judicial power.
It is my view, therefore, that the Court's effort to bring the
ripeness doctrine under the umbrella of the case or controversy requirement is unfortunate. Not only is constitutionalization inconsistent with the doctrine's premises, but it implies a rigidity and
formalism that are at odds with the doctrine's operation. It threatens further to complicate and confuse the case or controversy requirement as well. Ripeness analysis is intertwined with the posture, factual record, and substantive standards of the claim being
litigated. It cannot easily be encompassed by an independent, uniform constitutional limitation on judicial authority.
My efforts will explore both the nature of the ripeness standard and its relationship to the Court's vision of article III. In order to examine the propriety of making ripeness an article III requirement, it is necessary initially to consider briefly the Burger
Court's vision of the case or controversy standard. Part I of this
essay argues that the Court consistently turned to the concept of
"distinct and palpable injury" 17 as constituting the "essence" of
the case or controversy requirement. By demanding the demonstration of concrete harm to trigger judicial power, this injury standard is designed to ensure that justiciability analysis is not influenced by the validity, importance, or political desirability of the
claim on the merits.18
Part II turns to the workings of the ripeness doctrine. After
examining the goals and methodologies of the various types of
ripeness decisions, I conclude that they have little in common with
article III jurisprudence. The chief purposes of the ripeness inquiries-to fine-tune both the substantive claim and judicial decision
making-are intimately connected with the merits of the particular
claim, an inquiry that the uniform requirement of concrete injury
tries to avoid.
Finally, in part III, I argue that a marriage of ripeness and
article III is flawed. Not only is it inconsistent with the Court's
depiction of the case or controversy requirement, it is a wrong turn
analytically-both for ripeness and for article III.
I.

THE BURGER COURT AND ARTICLE

III

The decisions of the Burger Court implementing the case or
controversy requirement can reasonably be described as inconsis17

See Warth, 422 U.S. at 501.

Is Id. at 499-500.
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tent.19 The Court has been quite consistent, however, in its descriptions of article III's demands. In Valley Forge v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, it explained that a
"recent line of decisions . . has resolved the ambiguity" over the
fundamental content of article III.20 At an "irreducible minimum"
the Constitution requires "actual or threatened injury as a result of
the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant. ' 21 This individual
injury standard, as Justice Powell has written, forms the "essence"
of the case or controversy requirement. 22 In explaining the contours of the requirement, modern standing rulings have provided
the fullest exploration of the aims and rationale of the article III
standard, as well as the distinctions to be drawn between the constitutional and prudential limits on the exercise of judicial power.
As the framers envisioned, article III limits the authority of
the federal courts to the consideration of cases of "a Judiciary nature."23 Of course, describing the parameters of the judicial case
requirement has proved no easy matter. For the bulk of our legal
history, the case or controversy standard was defined, if at all, by
analogy to the common law system of adjudication.24 Occasionally,
decisions construing article III suggested prohibitions against issuing advisory opinions 25 and entertaining collusive suits, 26 and even
constitutional limits on the reach of the Declaratory Judgment
Act. 27 Primarily, however, the federal courts measured their power
to decide cases by asking whether the litigant asserted a legal in" See, e.g., Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133
U. Pa. L. Rev. 635 (1985); Mark V. Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 Cornell L. Rev. 663 (1977).
20 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
21 Id.

2' Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 218-19 (1974). See also
Richardson, 418 U.S. at 194 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell is the principal architect
of the constitutional standard of particularized injury. For the prime example, see Warth,
422 U.S. at 490.
" Max Farrand, 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 at 430 (1911).
U See generally Joseph Vining, Legal Identity: The Coming of Age of Public Law
(1978).
"6See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911); Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103
(1969). The first example is the famous August 8, 1793, letter from Chief Justice John Jay to
President George Washington refusing to render an advisory opinion on a treaty question,
reprinted in Paul M. Bator, Paul J. Mishkin, David L. Shapiro, and Herbert Wechsler, Hart
and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 64-65 (2d ed. 1973).
26 See, e.g., Johnson, 319 U.S. at 303-05 (collusive suit not a real case or controversy).
'7 See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937) (upholding constitutionality
of Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934 as applied to "actual cases or controversies"). In part
H-B, I will argue that cases such as Haworth are most appropriately seen as standing decisions, not as ripeness decisions.
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terest recognized by the Constitution, statutes, or the common
28
law.
But the expansion of "public law" litigation 29 eventually
forced the courts to stop interpreting the case or controversy standard by analogy to common law adjudication, and thus to abandon
the legal interest test." By the early 1970s, in Association of Data
Processingv. Camp, the Supreme Court had scrapped the legal interest test in favor of a simple demand for "injury in fact."'" Building on this foundation, the Burger Court regularly characterized
the case or controversy mandate as a demand for "distinct and palpable injury. '3 2 The goal in turning to the harm standard was
straightforward. The Court contended that its harm-based standard is a "means of 'defining the role assigned to the judiciary in a
tripartite allocation of power.' "s Absent litigants "who can show
'injury in fact,' -14 the Court indicated, "the power 'is not judicial
. . .in the sense in which judicial power is granted by the Constitution to the Courts of the United States.' "3 Article III's "bedrock
requirement"36 of individual harm, therefore, is the primary tool
by which the Court has attempted to limit the purview of the federal tribunals to cases of a "judiciary nature."
The injury test was adopted expressly to remove the article III
"case" determination from the sway of the decision on the merits.
In Data Processing,the Court declared that while "the 'legal interest' test goes to the merits, 37 article III's core standing require-

2 See, e.g., Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 151-53
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
2' See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L.

Rev. 1281 (1976) (describing extensive changes in judicial function under "public law" litigation from private model of two-party disputes).
30 See Vining, Legal Identity at 26-27 (cited in note 24); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 Yale L. J. 1363, 1368-71 (1973).
3- 397 U.S. 150, 152-53 (1970). In addition, under Data Processing the injury must be
to an interest arguably within the "zone of interests" protected by the provision in question.
Id. This standard looks much like the "legal interest" test, but now is based on prudential
rather than constitutional concerns and, in practice, seldom poses a bar to jurisdiction.
32 Warth, 422 U.S. at 501. Plaintiffs also have been required to assert that their injuries
"fairly can be traced" to the defendant and are "likely to be redressed by a favorable decision." EKWRO, 426 U.S. at 38, 41. These requirements, I have argued, are logical extensions
of the injury requirement: they ensure a sufficient relation between the harm on which the
lawsuit is based and the particulars of the claim on the merits. See Nichol, 133 U. Pa. L.
Rev. at 645-49 (cited in note 19).
33 Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474, quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 95.
Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 473.
' Id. at 471, quoting United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. 48 (1852).
3' Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 471.
17 397 U.S. at 153.
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ment is "different."3 8 The constitutional standard "in no way depends" on the substantive issues litigated or on the evaluation of
the claim. 9 Moreover, the demands of the case or controversy
standard do not "diminish as the 'importance' of the claim . . .
increases,"' 4 0 nor do they countenance a "hierarchy of constitutional values or a complementary 'sliding scale' ,,41 allowing easier
access for some actions than for others.
In short, the Burger Court's treatment of the case or controversy requirement in the standing area-the area in which the
Court has most fully articulated the requirements of article
III-casts the constitutional "case" demand as an objective, concrete, independent barrier to the exercise of judicial power. Removed from the validity of the cause of action-its importance or
attractiveness-article III provides a supposed 2 freestanding trigger to the employment of judicial authority while ostensibly avoiding the "premature legal value judgments" 43 that would follow
from turning to the merits.
The Burger Court's vision of article III also can be illuminated
by considering the standing guidelines that the Court has imposed
that are not required by the case or controversy mandate. Cases
consistently point to a set of "prudential" principles 44 restricting
the availability of the federal forum. Claimants must, in the usual
course, assert their own rights rather than those of third parties.4 5
The Court will not consider "abstract questions of wide public significance" or a mere "'generalized grievance' shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens.1 48 And a
plaintiff's claim must fall within the "zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the . . . guarantee in question. 4 7 It is now
"settled that such rules of self-restraint are not required by
Art[icle] III but are 'judicially created overlays that Congress may
38 Id.

Richardson, 418 U.S. at 174, 180-81 (Powell, J., concurring).
Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 484.
41 Id.
41 I have argued elsewhere that the injury determination is far more complex and malleable than the Burger Court's article III rulings suggest. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Injury and
the Disintegration of Article III, 74 Cal. L. Rev. (forthcoming 1987).
43 William Burnham, Injury for Standing Purposes When Constitutional
Rights Are
Violated: Common Law Public Value Adjudication at Work, 13 Hastings Const. L. Q. 57,
111 (1985).
41 Warth, 422 U.S. at 498.
45 Id. at 499.
41 Id. at 499. See generally Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99100 (1979); Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 80.
' Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153.
40
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strip away.' "48
As a package, then, the modern standing decisions reveal an
ascertainable portrait of both the purpose and the configuration of
the case or controversy requirement of article III. Employing an
overarching trigger based on individual harm, the injury standard
ensures the existence of a constitutional case-and thus comports
with the judicial power-without becoming embroiled in the particulars of the substantive claim.
The third party, generalized grievance, and zone of interest
rules each assume the existence of constitutionally recognized injury. The third party and zone of interest tests explore the intended beneficiaries of the substantive principles on which the
cause of action is based; they attempt to ensure that appropriate
parties control the decision to litigate.' 9 The Court cautions restraint in suits based on widely shared injuries so as to temper interference with the operation of other branches of government
when those injured may have the political power to protect
themselves.5 0
The Burger Court's portrait of article III is to this extent a
reasonable one. It carves out for the case or controversy requirement a limited but vital role. The constitutional standard does not
embody all that is good or valuable in jurisdictional decision making. A variety of determinations are characterized as examples of
prudent "self-governance"-allowing for a heavy dose of fact-based
discretion and the essential involvement of legislative choice. Even
more importantly, some jurisdictional rulings are spared the fate of
being constitutional decisions.
Only the heart of the inquiry-the admittedly complex 51 injury determination-is given constitutional status. It "states a limitation on judicial power, not merely a factor to be balanced in the
weighing of so-called 'prudential' considerations. ' 52 According to
the Court, "neither the counsels of prudence nor the policies implicit in the 'case or controversy' requirement should be mistaken
for the rigorous article III requirements themselves. '53 As the following sections reveal, the multifaceted ripeness requirement is
difficult to square with such a stark portrait of article III.
48 Richardson, 418 U.S. at 196 n.18 (Powell, J., concurring), quoting Gerald Gunther
and Noel T. Dowling, Cases and Materials on Constitutional Law 106 (8th ed. 1970).
4, See Nichol, 72 Cal. L. Rev. at 95-98 (cited in note 15).
:0 See Warth, 422 U.S. at 501.
1 See generally Nichol, 74 Cal. L. Rev. (cited in note 42).
52 Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475.
53 Id.
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II.

RIPENESS

The central principles of the ripeness doctrine are unproblematic. The "basic rationale" of the ripeness requirement is
"to prevent courts, through the avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements" with
55
4
other organs of government.5 In Abbott Laboratoriesv. Gardner,
still characterized as the "leading discussion" of the doctrine, 5 the
Court indicated that the question of ripeness turns on "the fitness
of the issues for judicial decision" and the "hardship to the parties
'57
of withholding court consideration.
It is easy to conclude, with Professor Davis, that the approach
of Abbott Laboratoriesprovides an "excellent foundation" for the
analysis of ripeness issues.5 8 Its open inquiry avoids both the rigidity of prior ripeness law59 and the questionable systems of classification that characterize other justiciability doctrines.6 0
As the following sections reveal, ripeness analysis serves a variety of goals and employs several distinct processes. Commentators have ordinarily approached the decisions either chronologically"1 or by reviewing the nature of the factors shaping the various

'4

Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967). Although Abbott Labora-

tories raised the possibility of a dispute between the courts and an administrative agency,
the ripeness doctrine is likewise used to avoid disputes between the courts and other organs
of government. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997-98 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (using ripeness principles to dismiss challenge to President's abrogation of treaty
with Taiwan).
387 U.S. 136 (1967).
" See Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission, 461 U.S. 190, 201 (1983).
61Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 149. For examples of cases applying this formula,
see Toilet Goods Assn. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967); EKWRO, 426 U.S. 26; Harrison v.
PPG Industries, 446 U.S. 578 (1980); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agr. Products Co., 105 S.Ct.
3325 (1985).
6'Davis, 4 Administrative Law Treatise § 25:6 at 370 (cited in note 16). See also
Wright, Miller, and Cooper, 13A Federal Practice at 112 (cited in note 16) (Abbott formula
"generally satisfactory").
59 Compare, for example, the modern decisions with the analysis employed in Public
Service Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1952) (declaratory judgment available
only in cases that admit of "an immediate and definitive determination" of the legal rights
of the parties) and International Longshoremen's Union v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 224 (1954)
(declaratory relief not available "to obtain a court's assurance that a statute does not govern
hypothetical situations that may or may not make the challenged statute applicable"). See
also Pub. Util. Comm'n v. United Air Lines, 346 U.S. 402 (1953) (two-sentence dismissal of
declaratory judgment suit without any analysis of the facts). But note id. at 403 (Douglas,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the case is "peculiarly one for declaratory judgment").
soSee Nichol, 72 Cal. L. Rev. at 73-82 (cited in note 15). (discussing "thinness and
artificiality" of Burger Court's application of injury in fact standard in standing cases).
" See C. Douglas Floyd, The Justiciability Decisions of the Burger Court, 60 Notre
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ripeness determinations.6 2 Although it may oversimplify the inquiry somewhat, my claim is that the bulk of the ripeness decisions
fall into three interrelated, but analytically distinct categories.
First, the ripeness doctrine has perhaps most frequently been
used to measure the demands of substantive statutory or constitutional causes of action. This application of the doctrine does not
relate to jurisdictional power at all. Instead, it is an aspect of actionability analysis-that is, the determination of whether the litigant has stated a claim on which relief can be granted. Second,
ripeness review often has been employed to determine whether the
litigant's asserted harm is real and concrete rather than speculative
and conjectural. This methodology parallels standing analysis.
Third, the ripeness requirement has been used to serve the goals of
prudent judicial decision making. In a series of decisions in which
the Abbott Laboratoriesformula figures prominently, the Supreme
Court has attempted to time the intervention of judicial power so
as to ensure more accurate rulings by the courts and to allow the
challenged government action to run its course more completely.
For the most part, these goals and processes are distinct from
those of the case or controversy requirement's injury determination. But the Supreme Court has been clear that, although the
ripeness demand may have begun as an exercise in judicial discretion,64 it is now firmly planted in the Constitution. In a series of
Dame L. Rev. 862, 922-36 (1985).
:2 See Wright, Miller, and Cooper, 13A Federal Practice at § 3532 (cited in note 16).
63 See Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 12(b)(6).
64 Earlier decisions distinguished the doctrines of standing, mootness, and ripeness
from the core article III "case or controversy" requirement:
The restriction of our jurisdiction to cases and controversies within the meaning of
Article III of the Constitution . . . is not the sole limitation on the exercise of our
appellate powers, especially in cases raising constitutional questions. . . . "The Court
[has] developed, for its own governance in the cases admittedly within its jurisdiction,
a series of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision."..
. . .
The various doctrines of "standing," "ripeness," and "mootness" . are but several manifestations-each having its own "varied application"--of the primary conception that federal judicial power is to be exercised. . . only at the instance of one who is
himself immediately harmed, or immediately threatened with harm, by the challenged
action.
Poe v. Ullman 367 U.S. 497, 502-03, 503-04 (1961) (citations and footnotes omitted), quoting
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). For other cases characterizing ripeness in other than constitutional terms, see, for
example, Toilet Goods Assn., 387 U.S. at 162-64 (interpretation of "final agency action"
requirement under § 10 of Administrative Procedure Act); Columbia Broadcasting System
v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 425 (1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
Of course, Justice Brandeis's classic concurrence in Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 346-47, labels
ripeness as a prudential restraint.
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cases dating from the mid-1970s, the Court has conflated the ripeness inquiry and the case or controversy requirement of article III,
repeatedly describing the ripeness inquiry as a "threshold" determination designed to measure whether the "'actual controversy'
. . . requirement imposed by Art[icle] III of the Constitution" is
met. 5 The decision in Babbitt v. Farm Workers, for example, employed the entire panoply of ripeness tools as aspects of the "case
or controversy [requirement] within the meaning of Article
III of
' 6 It is this turn that I find troubling.6 7
Constitution."
the
65Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 458 (1974); Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 433
(1975). See also Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 138 (1974) ("issues of
ripeness involve, at least in part, the existence of a live 'Case or Controversy"); Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Assn., 452 U.S. 264, 294 n.36 (1981) ("no justiciable case or
controversy" because challenge to statute not ripe for judicial resolution). Compare the related requirement of "concreteness" as treated in Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil
Co., 444 U.S. 572, 582-83 (1980) (article III case or controversy must be a "concrete controversy"); Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 297-98 (article III requires "a dispute definite and concrete, not
hypothetical and abstract"); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 128 (1973) (allegation of indirect
injury not sufficient to present case or controversy under article III); California v. LaRue,
409 U.S. 109, 112-13 n.3 (1972) (article III requires a "present and concrete controversy").
" 442 U.S. 289, 297 (1979). Babbitt employed substantive/actionability ripeness to conclude that a vagueness challenge to a labor ordinance was timely. Id. at 303-04. It used
injury/ripeness analysis to conclude that a challenge to a consumer publicity regulation was
appropriate. Id. at 300-02. And, it employed ripeness as a tool for factual specificity to reject
a challenge to the organizer access provisions of the ordinance on the ground that it was not
yet mature. Id. at 300, 303-04.
Prior to Babbitt, one still could have hoped that only part of the ripeness doctrine was
brought within article III. For example, in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Court
purported to distinguish between article III and "problems of prematurity and abstractness." Id. at 114. If that distinction had stood, the decisions could be read to constitutionalize only the injury/ripeness determination. Buckley involved an express statutory grant of
jurisdiction "intended to provide judicial review to the extent permitted by Art. III," id. at
12, and since the case involved a "real and substantial controversy," the Court accordingly
held the claim involved to be justiciable. Id. at 117-18. In standing law as well, the Court has
applied its standards liberally in instances where Congress evinced similar intent. See, e.g.,
Gladstone, Realtors, 441 U.S. 91 and Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205
(1972) (both holding that plaintiffs had standing under the Fair Housing Act of 1968, because Congress intended standing under the Act to extend to the limits permitted by article

III).
But after Babbitt, it seems that the Court will treat all uses of ripeness as equally commanded by article III. Moreover, Hodel, 452 U.S. at 293-97, and Steffel, 415 U.S. at 458-60,
employed substantive ripeness analysis as an article III endeavor. While Abbott Laboratories was originally an administrative law decision, most recently, in Pacific Gas & Elec., 461
U.S. 191, the Court characterized Abbott Laboratoriesas the "leading discussion" of the
ripeness doctrine while citing a case holding the ripeness standard to be part of article III.
461 U.S. at 201, citing Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102.
67 I realize that some cases predating the Burger Court appear to treat ripeness as a
demand of article III, especially cases involving the interpretation and constitutionality of
the Declaratory Judgment Act. For example, see Golden, 394 U.S. at 103; Haworth, 300 U.S.
at 239-40. Others at least read the Declaratory Judgment Act in conformity with article III.
See Wycoff, 344 U.S. 237. Some decisions, on the other hand, are simply unclear. See United
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In the next three sections, I sort out in greater detail the three
uses of ripeness doctrine identified above and consider their relation to the dictates of article III.
A. Ripeness and the Demands of Substantive Law
A comparison of two cases reviewed in the Supreme Court's
1984 term indicates that the ripeness determination is more complex than the apparent simplicity of the Abbott Laboratories
formula might suggest. In Williamson County Regional Planning
v. Hamilton Bank,6" the Court ruled that the plaintiff's fifth
amendment takings claim challenging various zoning regulations
was premature because the plaintiff had yet to institute an inverse
condemnation action under local law and had also failed to apply
for zoning variances.6 9 Prior to the Court's determination, however,
the plaintiff bank and its predecessor in interest, a real estate developer, had engaged in a fairly extensive series of transactions
with the zoning commission whose decision the bank sought to
overturn.
Some twelve years before the Court's ruling, the developer had
submitted a preliminary plat that was approved by the Planning
Commission. Based upon that acceptance, the developer conveyed
to the county a "permanent open space easement" for a golf course
and spent approximately $3,000,000 building the golf course and
$500,000 installing a sewer system. Six years after the acceptance
of the preliminary plat, the zoning commission gave final approval
to the permanent plat. Shortly thereafter, however, the commission changed its regulations and rejected the previously accepted
plat. When the developer, at the commission's request, submitted a
revised plat, the commission rejected it as well.70 The developer

Air Lines, 346 U.S. 402 (per curiam denial of declaratory relief, simply citing Wycofl). Yet,
before the string of cases cited in note 65 above, the constitutionalization of ripeness was far
from certain. An abundance of pre-Burger Court decisions characterize ripeness in other
than constitutional terms. For examples, see note 64 above.
My claim is that the constitutionalization of ripeness is unfortunate. I am less concerned with laying blame for the problem than with pointing out jurisprudential shortcomings. I do, however, attribute the problem to the Burger Court for two reasons. First, in the
Burger era, the Court made explicit what was before unclear: ripeness is part of article II.
Second, the Burger Court's decision, in Data Processing, to make standing law's injury requirement the core component of article III has rendered any tie of the ripeness doctrine to
the case or controversy requirement redundant. I discuss this second point in part 11-B

below.
e 473 U.S. 172, 105 S.Ct. 3108 (1985).
105 S.Ct. at 3119-22.
70

Id. at 3112-14.
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next appealed to the county zoning board, which reversed the decision of the commission. On remand, however, the commission determined that the county board lacked jurisdiction to hear commission appeals. The commission thus stood by its earlier ruling
rejecting the plat. At this point, the bank (now the owner) sought
72
relief in federal court 71-and its case was ruled premature.
The plaintiffs in National Gay Task Force v. Board of Education of the City of Oklahoma City73 had a considerably easier time
of it. There the plaintiffs, whose membership included teachers in
the Oklahoma public school system, 74 challenged a newly enacted
Oklahoma statute that made teachers' advocacy or promotion of
"public or private homosexual activity" 7 censurable. The record
did not reflect how the statute would actually have been enforced;
nor did it identify the specific activity, prohibited by the statute,
in which the litigants hoped to engage. No limiting construction
had been sought in the state courts, nor was any disciplinary action instituted or threatened. Yet the Tenth Circuit proceeded to
strike down the advocacy section of the statute without analyzing
the ripeness issue. The Supreme Court split four to four, thus affirming (without opinion) the decision below. Most surprisingly,
perhaps, it is fair to say that both Hamilton Bank and National
Gay Task Force were correctly decided under present ripeness
76
principles.
What is the measure of an independent constitutional barrier
that requires one litigant to pursue his claims for years with local
decision makers at great expense in order to bring his federal action to maturity, while another's action is thought to be ripe at the
mere enactment of the regulation challenged? The contrast between the jurisdictional hurdles applied in Hamilton Bank and
National Gay Task Force highlights the variable nature of the
ripeness doctrine.
In fact, the cases tell us far more about the demands of the
takings clause and the first amendment, respectively, than about
the requisites of article III. The ripeness requirement consistently
has been molded to meet the dictates of the substantive claim on
the merits. For several decades, the Court has allowed pre-enforce-

71

Id.

72 Id. at 3119-22.
73S729

F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd without opinion, 470 U.S. 903 (1985).

7' 729 F.2d at 1272.
75 Id.
71 See text at notes 77-84 and 101 below.
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ment challenges to laws regulating speech. Laws threatening sanctions for expression are said to "chill" potential speech.77 Rather
than force citizens to curtail the exercise of their asserted first
amendment rights in order to avoid prosecution, courts have permitted facial challenges to regulations of expression even before
the institution of other legal proceedings.7 8 Thus, the plaintiffs in
National Gay Task Force appropriately could assert concrete, present injury to their interests in free expression with the mere passage of the Oklahoma advocacy statute. As the Supreme Court
ruled in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 79 it is not permissible to
inhibit first amendment expression by forcing a teacher to "guess
what conduct or utterance may lose him his position" by violating
a "complicated and intricate scheme" of regulation. 0
The law of the takings clause of the fifth amendment, however, has followed a very different path. The Supreme Court has
characterized the takings inquiry as turning on "ad hoc factual"
determinations directed to "particular estimates of [the] economic
impact" on the property in question."' The Court has also ruled it
"particularly important" in takings cases that adjudication take
place in a concrete factual setting.8 2 The possibility of an administrative solution, of course, may alter the magnitude of the property
diminution. Thus, part of the concrete factual setting necessary to
the demonstration of a takings claim, apparently, is a showing that
the regulatory authority would deny approval for all uses that
would enable the plaintiff to obtain a "reasonable return" on its
investment.8 3 Since the developer in Hamilton Bank had failed to
exhaust all avenues afforded by local zoning ordinances, the claim
was ruled premature.

77 See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967); N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66-67 (1963). But
contrast Tatum, 408 U.S. at 11-15, where-this time employing standing analysis-the
Court held that absent threat of sanction, a claim that an alleged illegal domestic surveillance program chilled the plaintiff's speech did not create a justiciable controversy.
18 See, e.g., Steffel, 415 U.S. at 459.
79 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
80 Id. at 604.
S Hodel, 452 U.S. at 295.
82 Id. at 295-96.
83 Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978). As the
Supreme Court ruled in its latest term:
It follows from the nature of a regulatory takings claim that an essential prerequisite to
its assertion is a final and authoritative determination of the type and intensity of
development legally permitted on the subject property. A court cannot determine
whether a regulation has gone "too far" unless it knows how far the regulation goes.
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 106 S.Ct. 2561, 2566 (1986).
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In short, while the first amendment allows citizens to attack
regulations that may inhibit their speech even before such
regulations have been enforced, the takings clause demands a
showing by the challenger that the regulating authority has foreclosed all economically viable options. It is obviously more difficult,
therefore, to present a ripe takings claim than a ripe first amendment challenge. 4
The central reason for the distinction between the two lines of
cases is that the ripeness determination is inescapably intertwined
with both the substance of the claim on the merits and the procedural posture of the case on review. Whereas free speech 85 and
electoral88 challenges have faced minimal ripeness hurdles, claims
based on the freedom of association,8 7 equal protection 8 8 due process,8 9 the fourth amendment,9 0 and the right to travel 9 ' have been
ruled context-dependent and therefore subject to more stringent
ripeness demands. Broad-based facial attacks on legislative regimes, while less likely to prevail on the merits, have faced little
difficulty with the ripeness standard. 2 The common theme of such
rulings is the examination of what it takes to state a concrete cause
of action under the substantive principles upon which the claim is
based. As Professor Vining has written, the "court actually does
make a decision on the merits when it purports to choose the context in which the decision will be made.""
The interplay between ripeness and the substance of the claim

9, Compare Hodel, 452 U.S. 264 (takings challenge to federal statute regulating surface
mining dismissed as unripe challenge), with Steffel, 415 U.S. 452, and Keyishian, 385 U.S.
589 (first amendment claims held justiciable even at pre-enforcement stage).
as Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 66; Planned Parenthood Ass'n. of Chicago v. Kempiners,
700 F.2d 1115, 1122 (7th Cir. 1983); Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 625 (5th Cir. 1981);
Spartacus Youth League v. Board of Trustees of Illinois Industrial University, 502 F.Supp.
789, 796-97 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
86 See Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 301; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 117-18; Morial v. Judiciary Commission, 565 F.2d 295, 298 (5th Cir. 1977).
87 California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 55-56 (1974).
8 Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 504 (1982).
39 Southland Royalty Co. v. Navaho Tribe of Indians, 715 F.2d 486, 491 (10th Cir.
1983).
"0 Ellwest Stereo Theatres, Inc. v. Wenner, 681 F.2d 1243, 1248 (9th Cir. 1982).
91 Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1965).
82 See, e.g., National Gay Task Force, 470 U.S. 903; Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365
U.S. 43, 45-46 (1961). See also Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (reviewing
constitutionality of state antisubversive law over dissent by Justice Frankfurter arguing that
case was not yet ripe).
9 G. Joseph Vining, Direct Judicial Review and the Doctrine of Ripeness in Administrative Law, 69 Mich. L. Rev. 1443, 1522 (1971).
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9 4
is illustrated by Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates.
There, a vendor challenged a statute prohibiting the sale of materials "designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs."9 5
The attack was multifaceted. Flipside alleged that the provision
was both vague and overbroad under first amendment guidelines.
It also claimed that the statute could give rise to a pattern of discriminatory enforcement.9 6 The Supreme Court considered, and rejected, the vagueness and overbreadth claims. It held that the regulation satisfied specificity demands, and that the overbreadth
doctrine does not apply to commercial speech. The equal protection challenge, however, was dismissed on ripeness grounds. Although the likelihood of discriminatory application was substantial, the Court refused to address the problem at the preenforcement stage. Instead, it recognized that opportunities were
available for clarification by administrative regulation and that
there would be sufficient time to consider any specific claim of discriminatory enforcement when the village actually attempted such
7
enforcement.1
Since Flipside had been advised by local officials not to sell
various products thought to be prohibited by the statute, 8 a sufficient controversy was presented to allow the vagueness and overbreadth claims to be determined. The law of the first amendment
demanded no more than that the Court examine the face of the
statute to settle the substantive challenge. The rejection of the attack based on equal protection turned on substantive grounds as
well. The Court implicitly ruled that a cause of action based on
discriminatory enforcement demands the demonstration of specific
instances of harassment.99 Also implicitly, of course, the Court concluded that neither the equal protection clause nor the first
amendment invalidate a statute that merely poses a substantial
risk of discriminatory enforcement. In other factual contexts, however, such arguments have prevailed. 10 0

94 455 U.S. 489 (1982).

9 Id. at 492.
96 Id. at 494, 503.
'7

Id. at 497-504.

I' Id. at 493.
99 Id. at 503-06 & n.21.
100 See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 557-58 (1965) (striking down statute prohibiting
"obstruction of public passages" as leaving government officials with "unbridled discretion"); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 56, 58-59 (1965) (striking down film censorship
statute as providing insufficient procedural safeguards to avoid inhibiting expression);
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450-51 (1938) (striking down municipal ordinance requiring
permit for distribution of literature of any kind).
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The point here, of course, is not that the Court came to the
wrong conclusion in Flipside, but that its ripeness determinations
were substance through and through. The litigant's claims were either accepted or rejected not because of some constitutional barrier to the exercise of judicial power, but because in an exercise of
judicial power the justices ruled that no claim for relief had been
pleaded and proven. 101 The Hamilton Bank decision, also employing ripeness analysis, came to a similar conclusion about the takings clause. The plaintiff in Hamilton Bank could present no ripe
takings claim until all local avenues of relief had been pursued. In
both instances, the Court concluded that no constitutional violation had been shown.
To claim that ripeness decisions are often substantive rulings
in another form is not to argue that this use of the doctrine is illegitimate. It seems likely that Professor Bickel had it right when he
wrote that the ripeness determination "must depend on at least an
initial judgment of the merits. ' 10 2 It may well be that some of the
cases rejected as unripe for lack of concrete application 0 " should
have been dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted, rather than for lack of jurisdiction.10 4 But the
ripeness formula at least suggests that the legal shortcoming is one
of timing or factual development. It implies to the shunned litigant
that she may eventually have a cognizable claim.
It seems to me a major mistake, however, to confuse this sort
of inquiry with the application of a constitutional barrier to the
exercise of judicial power. The Burger Court treated the article IM
case or controversy requirement as an independent, objective limitation on judicial authority. The necessary implication of the
Court's moves to constitutionalize the ripeness doctrine, therefore,
is an assertion that the judiciary has no power to address the "premature" issues considered in the ripeness cases. When the Court
uses the ripeness standard in decisions such as those discussed
above, however, it does make a judgment on the merits. By ac101The Court in Flipside made no claim to be applying any article III requirement.

Nevertheless, elsewhere it has made clear that it intends to constitutionalize this aspect of
ripeness analysis which concentrates on the substantive claim. The decision in Babbitt, for
example, employed substantive or actionability ripeness to conclude that a challenge to an
allegedly vague labor ordinance was timely. 442 U.S. at 303-04. For other similar applications of ripeness analysis, see Hodel, 452 U.S. at 293-97; Steffel, 415 U.S. at 458-59.
102 Alexander
103

M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 135 (1962).

See, e.g., Hamilton Bank, 105 S.Ct. at 3116-22; Hodel, 452 U.S. 264.

" Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal of suits for "failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted."
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cepting pre-enforcement facial challenges in some substantive areas while demanding precise factual specificity in others, the Court
hones and adjusts its exercise of substantive review. It is probably
a mistake to characterize this method of analysis as jurisdictional
at all. It certainly cannot be considered a reasonable interpretation
of article III. The first problem with the Court's constitutionalization of ripeness analysis, therefore, is that it is inconsistent with
much of the actual operation of the doctrine.
B.

Ripeness and the Requirement of Actual Injury

Not every inquiry subsumed under the "compendious" 10 5 label
of ripeness constitutes substantive review. A substantial number of
ripeness cases ask whether the plaintiff has suffered harm or threat
of harm that is "direct and immediate,"1 0 rather than conjectural,
hypothetical, or remote.10 7 Because the federal courts may not issue advisory opinions, the ripeness requirement demands that the
litigant show that he actually has been hurt-in immediate
terms-by the actions of the defendant. Clearly this branch of
ripeness analysis is jurisdictional in nature. It may be argued as
well that the "real and immediate" standard involves the appropriate scope of article III "judicial Power."' 0 8
By applying a more sensitive measurement of concrete injury,
the Court has substantially liberalized access to judicial review
over the past three decades. Gradually, the Court has alleviated
the traditional dilemma of the federal plaintiff seeking to challenge
the constitutionality of government regulation. No longer do the
principles of federal jurisdiction require that he become a lawbreaker in order to get into court. 0 9 Ultimately, the Supreme
Court has concluded, with Professor Jaffe, that "even a wrongdoer
o Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch at 123 (cited in note 102).
Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 152. See also City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461

006

U.S. 95, 102 (1983); Steffel, 415 U.S. at 459; Poe, 367 U.S. at 501-04. For similar requirements, see Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298 (plaintiff must show "realistic danger of direct injury");
Lake Carriers Assn. v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 506 (1972) (construing "actual controversy" requirement of Declaratory Judgment Act).
I0" See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 690 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(injury too remote); Ellis, 421 U.S. at 434 (no "genuine threat"); Roe, 410 U.S. at 128 (injury
to marital happiness "indirect" and "speculative").
108 U.S. Const. art. III.
009 Contrast Lake Carriers Assn., 406 U.S. 498 (pre-enforcement challenge to state
water pollution control statute presented "actual controversy" within meaning of Declaratory Judgment Act) with Longshoremen's Union, 347 U.S. 222 (dismissing as unripe a preenforcement challenge to construction of immigration statute that would treat plaintiff's
members as aliens entering United States for first time).
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is entitled to know his rights." 110 Moreover, ripeness decisions repeatedly have recognized the present harms that flow from the
111
threat of future sanction.
Courts have used the ripeness standard to deny jurisdiction
where the plaintiffs have not, at least in the jurisdictional sense,
suffered real injury. The ripeness barrier has prevented review, for
example, of an assertedly dormant statute proscribing the use of
contraceptives. 11 2 In other instances, courts have held contingent
harms too remote to support jurisdiction."I3 Plaintiffs deemed
merely to have searched the statute books for grievances to assert
against the government have been rejected." 4 The Court also has
ruled that victims of government action that allegedly inhibits free
expression, but does not threaten legal sanction, have failed to
demonstrate immediate injury." 5 Finally, a federal court has ruled
that no concrete injury is established on the basis of uncertainty
whether a statute may be applicable to a plaintiff in the future."'
To my mind, the Supreme Court has not always hit home in
its measurement of actual injury. In Roe v. Wade, for example, the
Court characterized as contingent and speculative the injury suffered by a married couple, who feared the failure of contraceptive
devices and to whom pregnancy posed health risks, as the result of
a restrictive abortion statute. 17 But certainly the abortion ban imposed real and present limitations on the couple's sexual intimacy.
More surprisingly, in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, the Court re-

110 Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 417 (1965).
'1
See Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 62 (1976); United
States v. Geophysical Corp., 732 F.2d 693, 698-99 (9th Cir. 1984).
112 Poe, 367 U.S. at 501-09. When the statute later was enforced, the Court struck it

down in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
13 United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89-90 (1947); Atlanta Gas Light Co.
v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, 666 F.2d 1359, 1370 (11th Cir. 1982).
114 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41-42 (1971); United Presbyterian Church in the
U.S.A. v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375, 1378-79 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
115Tatum, 408 U.S. at 13-14. The Court distinguished Keyishian on the ground that
the plaintiffs there had actually been fired or threatened with firing. Id. at 12.
116 J.N.S., Inc. v. State of Ind., 712 F.2d 303, 305-06 (7th Cir. 1983). The J.N.S. case
illustrates the confusion existing in the federal courts regarding the roles of the case or
controversy requirement, standing, and ripeness. The Seventh Circuit reviewed the relevant
cases on article III and standing, id. at 305, and then simply concluded: "Whether couched
in terms of standing (the party bringing the suit) or ripeness (the timing of the suit), it is
clear that this plaintiff does not have sufficient stake in the outcome of this action at this
time to satisfy the case or controversy requirement of Article III." Id. at 306 (emphasis in
original).
117 410 U.S. at 128. Another plaintiff, who alleged that the restrictive abortion statute
intruded upon her right to privacy as guaranteed by the due process clause, was given
standing and, of course, ultimately prevailed on her claim. Id. at 124-25.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[54:153

fused to hear an injunctive claim lodged by the victim of a nearlyfatal police chokehold, since the plaintiff could not demonstrate
that "he was likely to suffer future injury from the use of . . .
chokeholds by police officers." 1 1 Again, the present injury sustained from the continuing employment of the practice could easily have qualified as tangible.
Regardless of these possible miscues, however, it seems clear
that inquiry into the nature and reality of the injury asserted is a
legitimate, if not essential, jurisdictional exercise. Under this rubric, the courts may measure the actuality of the claimed triggers
of federal power.
The problem with this line of ripeness cases, therefore, is not
the enterprise undertaken. Rather, it is doubtful that they are
truly ripeness determinations at all. In measuring whether the litigant has asserted an injury that is real and concrete rather than
speculative and hypothetical, the ripeness inquiry merges almost
completely with standing analysis. The standing requirement, the
cornerstone of the Burger Court's article III jurisprudence, 119 demands that a litigant show that he personally "has suffered some
threatened or actual injury" as the result of the conduct of the
defendant.1 20 This requirement of particularized actual injury repeatedly has been treated by the Court not only as constitutionally
mandated, but as the very core of the standing determination.121
What then is the distinction between the standing doctrine's
demand for "threatened or actual injury" and the ripeness cases'
focus on "direct and immediate" harm? Analytically, the two concepts could be segregated, despite the similar phraseology of their
standards. The standing doctrine might be used to analyze the nature and magnitude of present injuries. Only if such harms could
be considered concrete, objective, and judicially cognizable would
the standing barrier be overcome. The ripeness requirement, on
the other hand, would focus on the substantiality of threatened or
actually pending future injuries. Applying injury analysis on a forward-looking time frame, the ripeness demand would measure the
present effects and hardships imposed by the threat of future gov118 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983).
11

The standing requirement has been the tool that the Court has used most consist-

ently to measure the dictates of article III. See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 471-76. See also
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) ("[t]he Article III doctrine that requires a litigant
to have 'standing' to invoke the power of a federal court is perhaps the most important" of
the article III doctrines).
120 Wrth, 422 U.S. at 499.
121 See Allen, 468 U.S. at 751; Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472; Warth, 422 U.S. at 501.
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ernment action. In theory, therefore, each doctrine could serve distinct but related functions.
It is clear, however, that no such line of demarcation can be
located in the cases. The "natural" overlap between standing and
ripeness analysis occurs in the measurement of the cognizability of
contingent or threatened harms. In such cases, the Burger Court
appears to have used the two lines of inquiry interchangeably.
Laird v. Tatum, 12 2 for example, presented a challenge to the
operation of a domestic army intelligence-gathering system. Because the plaintiffs could point to no threat of sanction resulting
from the security operation, the Court characterized their claim as
a naked allegation that the army might someday misuse the information to the detriment of the plaintiffs. 123 Employing standing
analysis to dismiss the claim, the justices ruled that the plaintiffs
had failed to demonstrate that they were "'immediately in danger
of sustaining a direct injury as a result of [the Army's] action'"
and, therefore, "'could not invoke the judicial power to determine
the validity of [the] action.' ",124 In Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth,12 the Court similarly employed standing rather

than ripeness principles, this time to determine that a group of
doctors had alleged a "sufficiently direct threat of personal detriment" to obtain pre-enforcement review of an allegedly restrictive
abortion statute that had been 12enacted but had not yet taken effect when the action was filed. 0
In O'Shea v. Littleton127 and Rizzo v. Goode,128 suits aimed at

correcting future problems in the administration of criminal justice
were dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. As if to emphasize the
confusion, the Court in Rizzo simply concluded that the "requisite
'personal stake' ,,129 to make out "the requisite Art[icle] III case or
controversy"130 was lacking-without indicating whether it was the
standing or the ripeness hurdle, or both, that had proven fatal. 3 1
408 U.S. 1 (1972).
Id. at 13.
124 Id., quoting Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937).
125 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
126 Id. at 62.
'

'2

1

414 U.S. 488 (1974).

128423 U.S. 362 (1976).

Id. at 372-73, quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
Id. at 371-72. See also Littleton, 414 U.S. at 493-94.
131 A number of courts of appeals decisions also appear to have used standing and ripe119

ISO

ness analysis interchangeably. See, e.g., Athens Lumber Co., Inc. v. Federal Election Commission, 689 F.2d 1006, 1011-13 (11th Cir. 1982); Reeves v. McConn, 631 F.2d 377, 381 (5th

Cir. 1980).
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More recently, in Lyons, the Court relied on the standing doctrine
to hold that a victim of a prior chokehold could appropriately present a damage claim based upon his past injury, but could assert
no "real and immediate" harm to justify enjoining the future use
of the practice. 13 2 Commentators have, not unreasonably, treated
Lyons as a ripeness case. 133 But the Court did not.
This all appears, no doubt, as the rankest sort of debate over
semantics. More, however, is at stake. It is likely that this confusion between the two lines of inquiry has contributed to the Burger
Court's inclination to constitutionalize ripeness. The Court has
consistently maintained that standing's formula of injury, causation, and redressability is mandated by article III.23" If much of the
ripeness determination is indistinguishable from the injury analysis demanded by the standing doctrine, it follows easily that the
ripeness hurdle is constitutionally commanded as well. It is my
contention, though, that the determination of whether a litigant
actually suffers real or threatened injury is a task that "case or
controversy" jurisprudence has allocated to the standing doctrine.
The ripeness inquiry, on the other hand, is designed to serve goals
quite separate from the injury requirement.
Professor Wright has argued that "as compared to standing,
ripeness assumes that an asserted injury is sufficient to support
standing, but asks whether the injury is too contingent or remote
to support present adjudication."'3 5 A finding of actual or
threatened injury sufficient for purposes of article III, therefore, is
a first step, subsumed by the standing doctrine, in the examination
of whether jurisdiction attaches. The ripeness standard, designed
to be discretionary in nature, operates as an additional hurdle to
the exercise of judicial power. Serving to fine-tune the decisionmaking process of the federal courts rather than measure the demands of substantive constitutional principle, ripeness analysis
carries the banner of prudence rather than power.
The Abbott Laboratories formula itself bears out this interpretation. Balancing the "fitness of the issues for judicial decision"
against the "hardship on the parties of withholding court consider-

132

Lyons,'461 U.S. at 110.

See, e.g., Floyd, 60 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 929-30 (cited in note 61). This interpretation of Lyons is understandable because the Court used the "direct and immediate" standard-normally part of the ripeness inquiry-as its guidepost in determining standing. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102.
133

134

See note 119 above.

135 Wright, Miller, and Cooper, 13A Federal Practice at 130 (cited in note 16).
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ation" 13 61 assumes the existence of concrete injury. The balancing
formula then asks if the injury is of sufficient magnitude to overcome problems of contingency or speculation in the decision on the
merits. Professor Bickel described the relationship between the
two methodologies in perhaps the clearest terms:
To state the matter plainly, government action may well have
hurt the individual plaintiff, so that his standing in the pure
or constitutional sense is beyond doubt ..
. But the action he
complains of may nevertheless be in its initial stages only; if
he waits a little while longer, he will be hurt more. This
sounds gratuitously harsh, but the damage may not be major
or irremediable. The point is that, if litigation is postponed,
the Court will have before it and will be able to use, both in
forming and supporting its judgment, the full rather than
merely the initial impact of the statute or executive measure
whose constitutionality is in question. To put it in yet another
way, pure standing ensures a minimum of concreteness; the
other impure elements of standing and the concept of ripeness
seek further concreteness, in varying conditions that cannot
13 7
be described by a fixed constitutional generalization.
In the decades since Bickel wrote that passage, the Court consistently has loosened the ripeness standard, asking less frequently
that the litigant "wait a while longer" and "be hurt more." As part
of the process of liberalization, however, it appears that the Court
on occasion has fused the two lines of inquiry. It has employed
ripeness to measure the "minimum of concreteness" thought to be
demanded by article III.
That first mistake is perhaps the cause of a second one: the
conclusion that the ripeness doctrine itself springs from the article
III case or controversy requirement. Professor David Currie has
written that while standing asks who is a proper party to litigate,
ripeness asks "when a proper party may litigate."13 8 The Burger
Court has stated in quite specific terms that whether one is a
proper party for purposes of the case or controversy requirement
depends on whether one is actually injured. Ripeness occasionally
demands more of admittedly injured plaintiffs. It is, therefore, as
Justice Brandeis claimed, a rule fashioned by the Court "for its
own governance," shaping the decision-making process in cases
Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 149.
Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch at 123-24 (cited in note 102).
88David P. Currie, Federal Courts: Cases and Materials 71 (3d ed. 1982).
'
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"confessedly within its jurisdiction. "139
C.

Ripeness as a Tool of Judicial Decision Making

Stripped of its ties to standing and the case or controversy
requirement, ripeness is best understood as a malleable tool of judicial decision making serving a number of interrelated purposes.
As discussed above, 140 there is a desirable, perhaps even necessary,
link between the ripeness determination and the substantive claim.
So considered, the ripeness standard has been used to measure
whether the litigant, in the case before the court, has set forth the
essential elements of a mature challenge. The Supreme Court also
may have used the ripeness standard, as Professor Bickel urged, to
examine the ripeness not only "of the case, but of the ultimate
issue itself . . . in the largest sense, and in the full political and
historical context.'1 41 Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Goldwater v. Carter 42 suggested this somewhat grander use of ripeness.
In refusing to consider Senator Goldwater's constitutional objections to the revocation of a treaty with Taiwan, Justice Powell
hinted that such substantial oversight of presidential authority
43
should, at the least, occur only on a strong showing of necessity.
The opinion also can be read to go further, recognizing that the
Court should refuse to entertain a dispute between the branches of
44
government unless Congress forces its hand.
The balancing contemplated by Abbott Laboratories,however,
includes a range of concerns broader than the dictates of the claim
on the merits. Other considerations can caution against review.
Ripeness analysis has been used, for example, as a tool by the
Court to help ensure precision in judicial decision making and to
prevent judicial intrusions on proper and efficient allocation of
governmental powers.
It is obviously permissible for a court to demand that one asking it to exercise powers of constitutional or statutory review
demonstrate with clarity the case for employing judicial authority.
It seems apparent, then, that a case is not ripe "for judicial deter145
mination if issues are unclear or needed facts are undeveloped.'
"I
140

141
.42

Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 346 (concurring opinion).
See part II-A above.
Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch at 124 (cited in note 102).
444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979). The majority dismissed the Goldwater lawsuit in a per

curiam opinion.
,43Id. at 997.
,44Id. at 998.
145 Davis, 4 Administrative Law Treatise § 25:11 at 385 (cited in note 16).
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Rescue Army v. Municipal Court14 6 provides perhaps the leading

example. There, the Court refused to entertain a constitutional
challenge to a local prosecution. The appeal arose from a ruling on
a demurrer and presented a particularly poor record: many of the
statute's issues were inextricably intertwined, and many of the underlying issues had yet to be resolved by the state courts. The
shape in which the constitutional issues reached the Court was
seen as an "insuperable obstacle to any exercise of jurisdiction."' 47
The opinion indicated that a dispute is ripe only if the issues are
presented in a "clean-cut and concrete form, unclouded by any serious problem of construction relating either to the terms of the
questioned legislation or to its interpretation by the state
courts."' 4 8

In cases like Rescue Army, the judicial decision to wait is
designed neither to ensure that the requisite harm exists to invoke
jurisdiction nor to measure the demands of a particular claim on
the merits. Injury, again, is assumed. As the Court ruled in Babbitt
v. Farm Workers, adjudication may be postponed until a better
record exists "[e]ven though a challenged statute is sure to work
the injury alleged."' 49 The interest protected by the Court is its
own. Litigation based upon hypothetical possibility rather than
concrete fact is apt to be poor litigation. The demand for specificity, therefore, stems from a judicial desire for better lawmaking.
The District of Columbia Circuit made this point clearly in a
recent ripeness ruling, Androde v. Lauer. 50 The court concluded
that the Abbott Laboratories formula required the judiciary to
"'balance its interest in deciding the issue in a more concrete setting against the hardship to the parties caused by delaying review.' ,'i' Analytically, therefore, this use of the ripeness doctrine

is largely indistinguishable from the courts' employment of the
panoply of other tools to assure the adequacy of the record and the
requisite breadth of representation by the parties. 15 Once actual
injury for purposes of article III standing is shown, however, this
146 331 U.S. 549 (1947).

Id. at 574.
Id. at 584.
1, Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 300.

17

:49

150 729 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

Id. at 1480, quoting Webb v. Dep't of Health & Human Services, 696 F.2d 101, 106
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (emphasis added).
152 1 have in mind especially the tools available to judges such as inviting intervention
and amicus presentations and giving discretionary notice in class actions. See Mark V.
Tushnet, The Sociology of Article III: A Response to Professor Brilmayer, 93 Harv. L. Rev.
1698, 1707 (1980).
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demand of ripeness analysis amounts to no more than a prudential
counsel in factually ambiguous circumstances to "delay resolution
. . . until a time closer to the actual occurrence of the disputed
event" if a "better factual record might be available." 153
Finally, the ripeness formula of Abbott Laboratories allows
the courts to postpone interfering when necessary so that other
branches of government, state and federal, may perform their
functions unimpeded. Developed in the context of federal administrative law, the formula provides agencies "an opportunity to function-to iron out differences, to accommodate special problems,
[and] to grant exemptions" before judicial intervention occurs."
Analogous problems arise when federal courts review the acts of
state officials. The doctrine thus has been employed to limit judicial examination of the decisions of state administrative, 155 judicial,56 legislative,' 57 and executive 58 officers and federal administrative officers' 5 9 that the courts have considered still preliminary
in some regard. The ripeness barrier thus allows federal courts to
give due respect to the scope of responsibilities allocated to other
government decision makers. It limits any judicial proclivity to
"pre-empt and prejudge issues that are committed for initial deci' 160
sion to an administrative body or special tribunal.'
Of course, the standing doctrine's demand for "actual or
threatened injury" carries the bulk of the burden in dismissing
claims challenging government action that has yet to mature. A lit-

Regional Rail Reorganization Cases, 419 U.S. at 143.
I" Toilet Goods Assn., 387 U.S. at 200 (Fortas, J., concurring and dissenting).
Employing the ripeness doctrine to allow other governmental decision makers "an opportunity to function . . . to accommodate special problems" obviously entails use of the
doctrine to further interests in the separation of powers and federalism. There is no reason,
however, that prudential jurisdictional devices should be precluded from serving the goals of
federalism and separation of powers. When the Court ruled in Warth v. Seldin that prudential concerns weigh against the judiciary addressing "abstract issues of wide public significance" or mere "generalized grievances," 422 U.S. at 499-500, I assume the justices sought to
ensure an appropriate separation of powers. The rule in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971), limiting federal court injunctions against state criminal proceedings, is a nonconstitutional jurisdictional principle designed to serve the ends of federalism. The same is true of
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (limiting habeas corpus review of fourth amendment
claims), and Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (abstention doctrine).
wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402, 419-20 (1974); Wycoff, 344 U.S. at 246-47.
W'
"s Cross v. Lucius, 713 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. 1983); Peterson v. Sheran, 635 F.2d 1335
153

(8th Cir. 1980); Bergstrom v. Bergstrom, 623 F.2d 517 (8th Cir. 1980).
"I Young v. Klutznick, 652 F.2d 617, 626 (6th Cir. 1981); Chacon v. Granata, 515 F.2d
922, 924-25 (5th Cir. 1975).
"' Broderick v. di Grazia, 504 F.2d 643, 645 (1st Cir. 1974).
'19 Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, 666 F.2d 1359, 1370 (11th Cir. 1982).
160 Wycoff, 344 U.S. at 246.
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igant is not hurt, for example, by a rule that is considered but not
adopted. The ripeness standard provides an additional reason to
hesitate from taking jurisdiction, however, in circumstances in
which early judicial interference carries the implication that other
decision makers would be inclined to disregard the litigant's
interest.
In Broderick v. di Grazia,161 for example, the First Circuit dismissed a section 1983 action filed by police officers against the city
police commissioner. The plaintiffs claimed that the commissioner,
by declaring that "disciplinary cases against police officers should
be handled on the assumption that policeman are guilty until
proven innocent," effectively denied them due process in future
administrative determinations.1 6 2 Even if the commissioner's actions threatened an injury to the plaintiffs, however, the court
chose to defer to the eventual workings of local administrative and
judicial process. 6 3 Similar theories have led courts to postpone adjudication so as to leave open the "range of solutions" that legislative, executive, and judicial officials might consider.16 4 Federal
161504 F.2d 643 (1st Cir. 1974).
16 Id. at 644-45.
1613Id.
164 See

at 645.
notes 155-61 and accompanying text above. See generally David L. Shapiro, Ju-

risdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543 (1985).
It may appear that by arguing in this section for the use of ripeness as a prudential,
case-sensitive device, I attempt to reopen the classic debate between Professors Bickel and
Gunther over whether courts have discretion to decline for prudential reasons to exercise
jurisdiction properly given. See generally Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (cited in note
102); Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the Passive Virtues-A Comment on Principle
and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1964).
The earliest statement in the debate was Cohens v. Virginia's dictum that "[w]e have
no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which
is not given." 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.). Bickel, however, believed that the
Supreme Court, as the ultimate principled expositor of constitutional values, could appropriately exercise "prudence" in deciding when to decide. Bickel, The Least Dangerous
Branch at 131-33. Accordingly, he thought the Court's refusal to scrutinize Virginia's antimiscegenation statute in Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956), was justified because of the
political realities of striking down such a statute in 1956. Bickel, The Least Dangerous
Branch at 174. Gunther forcefully attacked this thesis. 64 Colum. L. Rev. at 11-13.
I do not, and need not, embrace such a powerful vision of "prudence" here. The "discretion" described here under ripeness analysis does not include consideration of the ability
of legal principle to withstand political fire. Much of the "discretion" in ripeness analysis is
an inescapable aspect of judicial decision making. A court must decide, for example,
whether first amendment claims are cognizable based on mere threat or only on the application of actual sanctions. And it must have the power as well to demand a full and concrete
record on which to base its decisions. See notes 145-53 and accompanying text above.
One ripeness consideration identified here could be seen as contrary to the Cohens
mandate: that of timing deference to other institutions of government. Even here, however,
the duty to "exercise the jurisdiction which is given" begs the question of whether what is
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courts, in short, are not the only entities charged with doing
justice.
III. RIPENESS AND ARTICLE III
The benefits of disassociating ripeness from the case or controversy requirement of article III are numerous. First, the fusion
of the two doctrines threatens the comprehensibility of article III.
The Burger Court tendered the theory-at least reasonable on its
face-that its article III analysis "in no way depends on the merits
'165
of the . . . contention that the particular conduct is illegal.
Nor, according to the justices, does article III countenance the recognition of any hierarchy of constitutional rights, some of which
pass the case or controversy hurdle more easily than others.16 6 It is
difficult to lay the ripeness doctrine, which is so heavily intertwined with the substantive cause of action and the posture of the
claim on the merits, alongside these article III case or controversy
pronouncements. If the ripeness rulings are rooted in the Constitution, then the free expression and electoral rights decisions establish, at a minimum, the hierarchy of textual rights that the Court
claims to eschew.
Ripeness rulings vary quite naturally, I have argued, with the
nature of the claim on the merits. It is not surprising, therefore,
that litigants and judges, following the Supreme Court's constitutionalization of the ripeness doctrine, are led to ask whether the
article III case or controversy requirement vacillates according to
the judge's view of the substantive cause. The Seventh Circuit, for
example, recently has declared that the ripeness requirement is
6 7 Of
"less strictly construed in the first amendment context."
course, that court correctly described the operation of the ripeness
principle. So put, however, the characterization seems strange for a
clear-cut, constitutionally imposed restriction on the power of the
federal courts.
Moreover, if the ripeness principle is to be subsumed within
"given" includes some discretion. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch at 126. In any case,
history has not been kind to the simple Cohens mandate. See, e.g., Younger, 401 U.S. 37
(prudential refusal to enjoin state prosecution, with many cases following it); Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. at 217 (multifactor description of "political question" analysis). It is not surprising
that Justice Brandeis's concurring opinion in Ashwander has had a far greater impact on
the law of federal courts than has Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Cohens. See notes 64,
139 and accompanying text above.
165 Warth, 422 U.S. at 500.
1:6 Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 484.
161 Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Chicago, 700 F.2d at 1122.
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the case or controversy standard, one can easily begin to wonder
what other doctrines of justiciability should enjoy that status.
Standing jurisprudence has excluded the third party rule and the
zone of interest test from constitutional status, largely because
those standards assume the existence of injury and then proceed to
foster other purposes that are substantive and prudential.16 Ripeness stands in an identical posture. 16 Are the zone of interest test
and the third party standing prohibition-despite the Court's constant indications to the contrary°170-now embraced by article III?
Moreover, as discussed above, many ripeness cases do no more
than analyze whether the litigant has stated a substantial federal
question under applicable substantive principles. This use of the
ripeness doctrine serves the same purpose as Rule 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6) defenses.17 1 While the takings clause demands the effective exhaustion of every possible avenue of redress, free expression
claims often can be presented on the basis of potential abrogation.
This difference is the product of the difference in the substantive,
constitutional law of the first and fifth amendments. Of course it is
possible to claim that federal courts lack the power to hear takings
cases unless a litigant has lost at every turn in the locale. But defining the elements of a cause of action is hardly the work of article
III. Would we also say that a section 1983 claim against a law enforcement official that fails to allege that the defendant's action
was taken under color of law should be dismissed for want of a
case or controversy?
The ripeness doctrine's demand for an adequate factual basis
for decision making, typified most prominently by the Rescue
Army decision, no doubt reflects sound judicial policy. However, if
it flows from the case or controversy standard, what then of Rule
19's indispensable party requirement17 2 or Rule 23(a)(4)'s demand
that representative parties fairly protect the interests of the
class? 7 Both are valuable tools for effective judicial decision makNichol, 72 Cal. L. Rev. at 95-98 (cited in note 15).
See discussion in text at notes 140-44 above.
170See, e.g., Warth, 422 U.S. at 499; Richardson, 418 U.S. at 196 n.18 (Powell, J., con168

169

curring); Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153.
171 These rules provide that a plaintiff's case can be dismissed for "lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter," Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 12(b)(1), or for "failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted," Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 12(b)(6).
171"If a person . . . cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it or should be
dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable." Fed. Rule Civil Proc.
19(b).
17. "One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on
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ing. Are they demanded by article III?
These examples may exaggerate the point. Nonetheless, it is
true that a doctrine as multifaceted as ripeness cannot easily be
confined within the limited horizons of article III's case or controversy doctrine. The Burger Court explained the case or controversy
requirement strictly in terms of the demand for concrete injury to
ensure the existence of a constitutional case. That venture alone
has led to substantial complications. 174 If the purview of the case
or controversy requirement is now, without explanation, to be expanded to include a plethora of unrelated interests, the future of
the doctrine's comprehensibility is bleak.
Nor is constitutionalization a good turn for the ripeness doctrine. First, it hardly serves clarity to link the ripeness principle to
its unfortunate jurisdictional counterpart, the standing doctrine.
The ripeness standard, when embodied in the Abbott Laboratories
formula, has performed admirably, if not flawlessly. 175 No one
makes a similar claim for the standing doctrine,'1 76 which is plagued
by vagueness and contradiction. 17 It is, to speak charitably, a doctrine in search of both principle and rationale. Prudence counsels
against permitting it to contaminate ripeness.
More fundamentally, constitutionalizing ripeness is at odds
with the flexible nature of the doctrine. The announcement that
the premature adjudication of claims violates the Constitution suggests a rigidity and uniformity of analysis, as well as an adherence
to principle, that have little in common with ripeness review. Consider an example. In Young v. Klutznick,17 8 the mayor and city of
Detroit challenged findings made by the federal census, claiming
that the census systematically undercounted minorities with the
result that Detroit would be underrepresented in Congress. The
Sixth Circuit dismissed the challenge as premature on the ground
behalf of all only if. . .the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interest of the class." Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 23(a)(4).
174 See generally Nichol, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 68 (cited in note 15) (exploring difficulties in
current standing doctrine).
175 For example, many cases under the Abbott Laboratoriesbalancing formula underestimate the present harm flowing from future sanctions. Consider, for example, Citizens
Action Coalition of Ind., Inc. v. Westfall, 582 F.Supp. 11 (S.D. Ind. 1983) (pre-enforcement
challenge to ordinance prohibiting solicitation of funds after sunset); McCollester v. City of
Keene, 668 F.2d 617 (1st Cir. 1982) (pre-enforcement challenge to local curfew); Boating
Industry Assn. v. Marshall, 601 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1979) (suit for declaratory judgment as
to coverage under Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, where Benefits
Review Board had yet to construe scope of "maritime employment" coverage provision).
176 See the authorities cited in Nichol, 72 Cal. L. Rev. at 68 n.3 (cited in note 15).
See generally Nichol, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 68 (cited in note 15).
'
652 F.2d 617 (6th Cir. 1981).
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that the Michigan legislature had not yet expressed its reaction to
the census. If Detroit's claims were true, Michigan might well
choose to adjust an upcoming apportionment to accommodate the
count deficiencies. Accordingly, the court of appeals ruled that the
issues presented were not "as 'specific' or as 'particularized'" as
179
they would be after the legislature acted.
Under the Abbott Laboratoriesformula, Young was probably
a close call. 180 The likelihood, or perhaps even the requirement,
that the Michigan legislature would use federal census figures to
reapportion would seem sufficiently strong to constitute hardship.
Moreover, given the article I, section 2 "as nearly as practicable"
standard, 8 1 underrepresentation could well have been rendered
more difficult to challenge after legislative action. Yet, a forthcoming apportionment scheme might have met Detroit's complaints,
and judicial review of the census process could have proven particularly troublesome. But however Young should have been decided,
it hardly aids the weighing process to give it constitutional
overtones.
Ripeness, as Young demonstrates, often calls for a uniquely
case-oriented evaluation of the practical probabilities presented by
the litigation. As Professor Jaffe argued, the doctrine demands
"reasoned balancing of certain typical and relevant factors for and
against the assumption of jurisdiction. 1 82 If the ripeness calculus
is rooted in the Constitution, however, the Abbott Laboratories
balancing process certainly will be skewed.
Tying ripeness to article III's case or controversy requirement
effectively instructs a federal judge that if she misapplies the ripeness standard and decides to reach the merits, she has not only
erred but has also passed a constitutional limit and abused judicial
power. The conscientious jurist thus might tend to dismiss any
close call under the Abbott Laboratoriesformula to avoid even potential usurpation. The careful weighing of factors both for and
against review that Abbott Laboratories solicits would be tipped
needlessly against plaintiffs. The wiser course, I suggest, is to return the ripeness doctrine to its prudential status.

171 Id.

at 626.
Judge Keith filed a dissenting opinion in Young, disputing the majority's contentions that the legislature might decide not to rely on the census figures and that the hardship to the parties was speculative. Id. at 626.
181See Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 527 (1979); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S.
1, 7-8 (1964).
Is'Jaffe, Judicial Control at 396 (cited in note 110).
Io

